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THE DANGERS OF REGULATORY
OVERREACTION TO THE OCTOBER
1987 CRASH
Lawrence Harris t
INTRODUCTION
The October 1987 crash was the largest stock market crash ever
experienced in the United States. Many people, remembering that
the Great Depression followed the 1929 crash, expressed serious
concerns about the 1987 Crash's potentially destabilizing effects.
Fortunately, these concerns have not yet been realized.
In hindsight, economic analyses show that the 1929 crash was
only a minor cause of the Great Depression. The most important
cause of the Depression was the tight monetary policy following the
crash. The Federal Reserve failed to provide liquidity sought by the
financial sector, and this led to several banking crises. The tight
monetary policy was implemented in response to fears about infla-
tion-the governors probably were overly impressed by the German
hyperinflation.
The Federal Reserve learned its lesson well. During the 1987
crash, it acted quickly and decisively to insure that adequate liquid-
ity would be available to the financial sector. As a result, few real
financial disruptions occurred. It appears that the danger of a major
decline in economic activity due to the crash has passed.
There is, however, another danger associated with the crash
that still threatens: the danger of overreaction. Many have called
for legislative and regulatory reforms to stabilize the financial mar-
kets. The suggestions include trading halts, price limits, restricted
access to computerized order submissions systems, greater margins,
transaction taxes, and various limits on mergers and acquisitions.
Although some policies would decrease volatility if adopted (some
would not), they may be so costly to the economy that they should
not be implemented.
Poorly designed policy generally yields poor results, despite the
t Associate Professor of Finance and Business Economics, School of Business Ad-
ministration, University of Southern California and Economic Fellow, Office of Eco-
nomic Analysis 9-1, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
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best of intentions. The long-run result of imposing limits on trad-
ing activity will be the loss of jobs in the United States securities
markets. Trading will moire to less regulated markets in Europe and
Asia. The cost of capital for domestic firms also will rise if investors
feel that the limits decrease liquidity. The long-run result of impos-
ing limits on mergers and acquisitions will be significantly less effi-
cient production in the United States economy.
This paper presents the economic arguments behind these con-
clusions. The presentation is divided into five sections. Section I
defines volatility and explains why some types of volatility are good
while others are bad. The distinctions are essential to any discus-
sion of the merits and costs of proposed market structure changes.
Section II discusses possible causes of the crash and explains why
such an event is not expected to reoccur. This section is included so
that the reader can decide whether problems exist that merit regula-
tory attention. Sections II and III also consider the pros and cons
for limits on trading activity, and Section IV considers limits on
mergers and acquisitions. The last section provides a short
summary.
I
VOLATILITY
Responsible discussions of volatility must differentiate between
fundamental volatility, transaction-induced volatility, and noise-in-
duced volatility. Fundamental volatility is related to uncertainty
about underlying security values. Transaction-induced volatility is
caused by the trading process. Noise-induced volatility is caused
when traders trade for sport or on information that they believe is
valuable but which actually is only noise.
A. Fundamental Volatility
Stock prices reflect the values of uncertain firm prospects.
When new information about these prospects is discovered, prices
change to incorporate it.' For example, the stock, price of an oil
drilling firm rises when it is learned that the firm has discovered oil;
it falls when it becomes obvious that they have drilled a dry hole.
Prices change because informed traders are willing to buy underval-
ued firms and sell overvalued firms.
Stock prices that accurately reflect all information about firms'
prospects are essential for allocating resources in our free market
I Well accepted theories of stock price formation can be found in introductory
finance texts such as R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed.
1988).
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economy. They determine the price at which firms are able to ob-
tain new capital. Firms with high stock prices obtain new capital eas-
ily by issuing a small amount of new stock. Firms with low prices,
however, must issue more new stock to obtain the same amount of
capital. Because capital is scarce, this rationing mechanism ensures
that the firms with the best prospects receive the resources needed
to implement their plans. In the example, it will be easier for a firm
that strikes oil to obtain new financing to continue exploring than it
will be for a firm that sinks dry holes.
Accurate and informative prices also determine the value of a
firm's resources under current management A poorly managed
firm has poor prospects relative to its prospects if well run. To the
extent that this is known, the firm will be undervalued in the market.
This makes it an attractive takeover target to investors who believe
that they can do better. In the oil example, the firm that consistently
finds oil may purchase the less able firm so that it can use the second
firm's resources to greater advantage. This argument supports not
only informative prices, but also free takeover markets.
Prices must change as the world changes if they are to reflect all
current information about firm prospects. Section III, shows that
some of the proposed limits on market activity can cause prices to
adjust slowly to new information. To the extent that this is true, the
proposed limits will impose costs on the economy.
B. Transaction-induced Volatility
Transaction-induced volatility results when buyers and sellers
do not arrive at the market at the same time. This volatility is associ-
ated with the market trading mechanism. 2 A simple example helps
define the concept: suppose that a buyer and a seller both want to
trade the same quantity at the last price at which a trade took place.
If they arrive at the market simultaneously, a transaction will take
place and there will be no price change. If they arrive separately,
however, they will either have to wait until the other arrives, or hope
that someone else will be willing to trade with them.
If no other buyer or seller wants to trade, that "someone else
willing to trade" will be a market-maker. Market-makers trade on
the expectation that they will be able to unwind their position when
the other side arrives. Market-makers must be compensated for this
service since it costs them their time and exposes them to risk. They
collect their compensation by selling at a high price (the ask) and
buying at a low price (the bid). The difference, the bid/ask spread,
2 A good introduction to market trading mechanisms and their relation to liquidity
and volatility can be found in K. COHEN, S. MAIER, R. SCHWARTZ & D. WHITCOMB, THE
MICROSTRUCTURE OF SECURITIES MARKETS (1986).
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represents the cost of being able to trade immediately to the buyer
and seller. They incur this expense because they are impatient to
trade.
Returning to the example, price rises to the ask when the buyer
arrives and falls to the bid when the seller arrives. The "bounce"
between bid and ask represents one form of transaction-induced
volatility.
This example implicitly assumes that market-makers know fun-
damental stock values. In practice, since these values are uncertain,
the transaction exposes market-makers to financial risk. If they un-
knowingly make market at a price lower than the fundamental value,
they will sell more stock at the ask than they buy at the bid. Better
informed traders will only want to purchase stock. This will deplete
market-maker inventories. Ultimately, price must rise to enable
market-makers to reestablish their initial positions. This requires,
however, that they repurchase stock at a price higher than their ini-
tial bid, the price at which they had expected to be able to repur-
chase stock. As a result, they will not capture the full bid/ask spread
on the round-trip transaction. They may even lose money. A simi-
lar problem results when market-makers unknowingly make market
at a price higher than the fundamental stock value.
Two types of market-makers can be identified by their response
to this problem: inside market-makers and outside market-makers.
Inside market-makers are poorly-informed traders who survive by
being very responsive to market conditions. Depending on the mar-
ket in which they trade, these traders may be known as specialists,
scalpers, floor traders, day-traders, or broker-dealers. Outside mar-
ket-makers are well informed traders who make market based on
their information. Although they may be found on the floor of an
exchange, they are more typically found at the trading desks of port-
folio managers and investment banking houses.
Inside market-makers know that they lose money to better in-
formed traders. They survive by taking this into account when they
trade. They quote a wider bid/ask spread than would be necessary
to compensate them only for their direct costs of making a market.
The difference allows them to collect from uninformed traders what
they lose to informed traders. They also revise their quotes fre-
quently in response to the order flow. When they see many buy
orders and few sell orders, they quickly raise their bid and ask
quotes, since they assume that the outside traders may know more
than they do about fundamental value. Their quick response in-
sures that they always remain close to their target inventory. If their
assumption is correct, the price changes that result contribute to
fundamental volatility. If the assumption is false, however, the re-
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sulting price changes contribute to a second form of transaction-
induced volatility: volatility due to order imbalances. In this case,
price would not equal fundamental value because of the order
imbalance.
Outside market-makers, by contrast, are well informed traders
who profit by trading when price differs from fundamental value.
When an excess of buy orders causes price to rise above fundamen-
tal value, these traders sell stock on the expectation that they will
profit when an imbalance of sell orders later arrives. Their interven-
tion limits the transaction-induced volatility due to order
imbalances.
The greater these uninformed imbalances are, and the greater
the associated transaction-induced volatility it, the more profitable
will be informed market-making. If the activity is more profitable
than the costs of being well informed, more people will become in-
formed. The potential for entry therefore places a long-run limit on
the volatility that can be due to other imbalances.3
Outside market-makers differ from inside market-makers in two
respects. Their superior information about fundamental value al-
lows them to take larger positions for longer periods of time with
less exposure to risk. Inside market-makers, however, can trade at
narrower spreads since their superior access to information revealed
through the order flow allows them to revise their quotes faster.
The magnitude of transaction-induced volatility depends on the
number of inside and outside market-makers, their willingness to
take positions, the likelihood that major order imbalances will be
due to uninformed trade, and, in the long-run, the costs of being
well informed. It also depends, as will be shown below, on the costs
that regulations impose on market-makers.
Transaction-induced volatility is undesirable. Bid/ask bounce
and uninformed order imbalances cause price changes unrelated to
fundamental value. These effects make prices less informative so
that allocation of capital is less efficient. They also decrease the
benefits that accrue to uninformed investors from their investments.
As a result, they offer less capital for investment, which increases
firm capital costs. To the greatest extent possible, market structures
that minimize transaction-induced volatility and hence transaction
costs, while still allowing fundamental price changes, should be
sought.
The identifying characteristics of transaction-induced volatility
3 Note that well informed traders are often called speculators when they trade on
new information and market-makers when they trade on old information. In fact, little
difference exists between the two activities. Both are conducted whenever price does
not reflect fundamental value.
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is that it results from transitory price effects. A transitory price ef-
fect will ultimately be reversed. Bid/ask bounce is a transitory effect
because a price drop from ask to bid follows a price rise from bid to
ask. Price effects dues to uninformed imbalances are also transitory.
A price rise due to an imbalance of uninformed buy orders will ulti-
mately be followed by a fall due to an imbalance of sell orders from
uniformed traders and from informed market-makers.
C. Noise-induced Volatility
Noise-induced volatility represents a special form of transac-
tion-induced volatility. It results when order imbalances are caused
by uninformed people who trade for pleasure or on information that
they believe is valuable but which in fact is useless. 4 These traders
are called noise traders because their actions add noise-errors-to
what otherwise might be full-information prices. The distinction be-
tween uninformed traders who trade for easily identified economic
reasons-cash flow investment and accommodation, portfolio
rebalancing, and hedging-and noise traders is important because
the desired purpose of some regulations is to remove the latter from
the markets.
Theoretical arguments concerning the effect of noise traders on
transaction-induced volatility are ambiguous. In the short-run,
more noise in the order flow may increase transaction-induced vola-
tility because it raises the probability of an order-flow imbalance. In
the long-run, however, volatility may fall because an increase in un-
informed orders increases the profits of informed market-makers,
causing more people to become informed. The result may be less
volatility and more informative prices.
It is, therefore, not obvious that volatility would be reduced if
noise trading could be selectively limited. In fact, since noise trad-
ers indirectly help finance information acquisition, they may be the
unsung heroes of the financial markets.
II
VOLATILITY, LIQUIDITY, AND THE CAUSES OF THE OCTOBER
1987 CRASH
Before examining the economics of trading activity limits, it is
useful to consider whether current market conditions warrant their
imposition. Since many argue that the crash evidences the need for
trading activity limits, this section examines the causes of the crash
in light of the definitions and discussions of the preceding section.
4 A discussion of noise trading with references can be found in Black & Fischer,
Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986).
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The discussion begins with the most popular explanations for the
crash.5
Many claim that the crash occurred when an imbalance of sell
orders exhausted market liquidity so that prices fell. To measure
the extent to which this might be true, examine the subsequent per-
formance of the market. If the drop (508 points on Monday) were
due only to an extreme order imbalance, price should have recov-
ered when buy orders subsequently arrived and when market-mak-
ing traders entered to provide liquidity. Although a substantial
rebound (200 points) occurred on October 20, a return to previous
price levels did not immediately happen. This suggests that an or-
der imbalance was only partially responsible for the crash. A fuller
explanation must be found by examining why fundamental valua-
tion changed and why the order flow came to be dominated by sell
orders.
Suggestions that prices fell because of bad news about funda-
mental firm prospects fail to satisfactorily explain the crash. No
event occurred whose impact, under any reasonable assumptions,
can account for the observed drop in prices. In particular, bad news
about interest rates, the trade deficit, the national deficit, and/or the
value of the dollar can at most be the trigger that started the crash,
not its fundamental cause. Proof of this point can be found by not-
ing that there was significant good news about all of these variables
after the crash, but no subsequent quick revaluation of a magnitude
equal to the crash.
Blame for the crash also has been directed at arbitrage between
index futures and stock. This explanation fails because the two mar-
kets provide markets for essentially the same underlying risk. All
strategies that can be executed in one market also can be (and often
are) executed in the other market. Their main difference is that the
futures market, under some circumstances, provides lower transac-
tion costs than the cash market. Arbitrage only serves to link the
two markets together. When sell orders are received in one market,
arbitrage distributes their impact to the other market. Arbitrage
cannot, however, explain why sell orders are submitted in the first
place.
Program trading has been blamed for the crash, but this expla-
nation also is weak. Program trading only provides the mechanism
by which orders are executed. Other mechanisms can be (and often
5 The following arguments are generally discussed in U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, The October 1987 Market Break: A Report by the Division of Market Regu-
lation U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (1988) and in the Report of the Presidential Task
Force on Market Mechanisms (1988) (commonly referred to as the Brady Commission
Report).
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are) used. Like arbitrage, program trading cannot explain why sell
orders are submitted. Moreover, as noted above, if the crash were
due to a trade mechanism, a full rebound would have occurred.
A partial cause of the crash can be found in the misuse of port-
folio insurance strategies. 6 Portfolio insurance attempts to replicate
the returns to a stock put option by a dynamic trading strategy.
Briefly, this strategy buys stock (or index futures) when stock prices
are rising, and sells stock when they fall. It works best if it is possi-
ble to buy and sell stock continuously at every price through which
prices fall or rise. Portfolio insurance is very expensive when con-
tinuous trading is not possible.
Portfolio insurance seeks to ensure that portfolio value does
not fall below some fixed value called the strike price. Its use is
most appropriate to entities such as defined benefit pension plans
that must fund some fixed future liability out of fund assets. In
practice, it appears that the strategy was used more as portfolio
manager insurance than as portfolio insurance. As such, the strat-
egy is supposed to ensure that the portfolio does not perform signif-
icantly worse than the market as a whole. In this application, the
strike price is ratcheted up underneath the value of the portfolio as
the market rises. The intent of the ratcheting up is to lock in gains.
Its effect is to cause more stock to be sold when price falls than
would have been sold had the strike price not been increased.
Nothing comes for free. The creation of an option has associ-
ated with it an option premium. Dynamic option replication ex-
tracts that premium through trading losses. The premium is
greatest when demand for the option is large relative to market li-
quidity and when volatility is high.
Portfolio insurance probably grew in popularity because man-
agers underestimated its cost and overestimated the risk protection
that it provides in practice. They therefore may have overvalued
stocks, believing that stocks were more secure than they were. This
could partly explain why prices appear to have risen beyond their
fundamentals in the year preceding the crash. It seems unlikely,
however, that it would account for a full 25 percent increase.
When bad macroeconomic news caused prices to fall during the
week prior to the crash, portfolio insurers had to sell index risk.
Their orders, and those of other traders who traded in anticipation
of portfolio insurance orders, caused prices to fall further. Soon
there was insufficient liquidity to satisfy these orders and prices con-
tinued to fall. This in turn caused more sell orders. Prices have not
6 A more complete discussion of the relation between portfolio and volatility is
presented in Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility of
Program Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 51 J. Bus. 275 (1988).
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fully rebounded because they may now be closer to their fundamen-
tal values.
This explanation suggests that liquidity played a role in the
crash, but not in the traditional sense. Prices dropped not because
there was an order imbalance that could not be filled, but rather
because traders learned that order imbalances could exist that could
not be filled. They learned that stocks were not as liquid as they
thought, and they therefore revalued stocks in a fundamental sense.
Since the crash, the portfolio insurance market has declined to
less than one-third of its former size. If the misuse of portfolio in-
surance partly caused the crash, a recurrence is less likely.
Perhaps the most important lesson for regulators is that liquid-
ity is valuable. Accordingly, if any regulatory changes are merited,
they should be directed at enhancing liquidity, rather than at de-
creasing the demand for it.
III
THE ECONOMICS OF TRADING ACTIVITY LIMITS
The crash generated a number of calls for market reform.
Among others, these include trading halts, price limits, restricted
access to computerized order submission systems, greater margins,
and transaction taxes. The stated purpose of these "circuit break-
ers" and "collars" is to decrease volatility and thereby restore confi-
dence in the markets. This section uses the tools developed in
section I to analyze whether these goals will be attained, and at what
cost.
Before each proposal is separately discussed, consider what
they have in common. All limit and/or increase the cost of trading.
Trading halts stop trading if price moves by more than some fixed
amount. After a recess, trading is then restarted. Price limits are
like trading halts, except that trading is halted until the next day.
Access restrictions to computerized order submission systems make
transacting more expensive by forcing manual execution. Larger
margins make larger speculative positions more costly. Transaction
taxes make frequent trading expensive.
Traders who believe that these rules do not produce benefits in
excess of the additional transaction costs that they impose will at-
tempt to evade them. It is therefore very important that their bene-
fits be well identified and real. Otherwise, their imposition will
damage United States security markets and strengthen those foreign
markets that provide a more attractive set of trading rules.
The argument is not simply an abstraction. The dollar
Eurobond market is a good example of what happens when exces-
sive restrictions are placed on trade. The SEC, acting in what it felt
1989] 935
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were the best interests of public bondholders, promulgated regula-
tions that required very expensive registration procedures for new
bond issues. Issuers responded by moving these transactions to Eu-
rope. The result contributed to the loss of a substantial fraction of
the United States bond market.
Another example illustrates the immediate potential of a shift in
equity trade from the United States to overseas markets. On Octo-
ber 19, 1987, one billion dollars of American stocks traded in
London before the New York markets opened. Orders for much of
this trade originated in the United States. One billion dollars is
more than one-tenth of the typical daily New York Stock Exchange
trading dollar volume. Although the day was unusual, it shows that
American security markets are vulnerable to foreign competition on
a meaningful scale.
A. Trading Halts and Price Limits
Trading halts recently were adopted by the New York Stock Ex-
change, American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange and various regional exchanges. 7 These will
halt trading for one hour if the Dow falls by 250 points. If the Dow
falls an additional 150 points after trade is reopened, trading will be
halted for two more hours. The second halt will have the same ef-
fect as a price limit if the episode starts in the afternoon.
Trading halts and price limits have the potential to reduce
short-term volatility by slowing price changes. Whether this is de-
sirable, however, depends on the cause of volatility.
Halts and price limits that limit fundamental price changes
harm the market. They postpone price changes that will simply oc-
cur when the markets reopen. While the markets are closed, how-
ever, prices are less informative and no one is able to trade. Some
traders may seek other markets in which to trade.
If halts and price limits decrease transaction-induced volatility,
they may be beneficial. It depends on whether the decrease in trans-
action-induced volatility is worth more than the lost trading oppor-
tunities. Two arguments suggest that halts decrease transaction-
induced volatility, while two others suggest that they increase this
volatility component.
Transaction-induced volatility may decrease if a trading halt al-
7 Exchange Act Release No. 26,198, 42 SEC Dock. 33 (1988); Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 26,218, 42 SEC Dock. 127 (1988); Exchange Act Release No. 26,357, 42 SEC
Dock. 595 (1988); Exchange Act Release No. 26,368, 42 SEC Dock. 655 (1988); Ex-
change Act Release No. 26,386, 42 SEC Dock. 686 (1988); and Exchange Act Release
No. 26,440, 42 SEC Dock. 875 (1988).
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lows outside traders greater time to respond to intraday margin calls
and/or to remove stop-loss orders. When outside traders are un-
able to satisfy their margin calls, brokers issue stop-loss orders.
Since stop-loss orders further imbalance an uninformed order flow,
a halt that reduces their number may reduce transaction-induced
volatility. Intraday margin calls, however, are quite rare.
Transaction-induced volatility may also decrease if a halt allows
outside market-makers time to enter the market to provide liquidity
when price is rapidly changing in response to an uninformed order
flow. This conclusion assumes that outside market-makers currently
are not fully aware of large price changes as they occur. The as-
sumption seems reasonable because outside market-makers are not
typically present on exchange floors. In practice, however, the de-
crease in volatility may be small because outside market-makers al-
ready can (and do) set up automated systems to notify them of
conditions under which they might want to trade. It is in their own
interest to be aware of these conditions since they profit by quickly
identifying and responding to pricing problems caused by excess
demands for liquidity.
Consider now two scenarios under which trading halts and
price limits increase transaction-induced volatility. If traders fear
that a halt will be called before they can submit their orders, they
may choose to submit them earlier than otherwise to increase the
probability that they are executed. Greater volatility will therefore
result as the price limit attracts orders from rationally fearful trad-
ers. Second, if outside market-makers reduce their surveillance of
the market assuming that they will be called when a trading halt oc-
curs, the market will become less liquid between trading halts, and
more trading halts will occur. This also will increase transaction-
induced volatility.
B. Access Restrictions to Computerized Order Submission
Systems
Restricting access to computerized order submission systems
represented the first significant regulatory response to the crash.
Immediately after the crash, program traders were prohibited from
using the DOT (Designed Order Turnaround) line on the New York
Stock Exchange.8 Until recently when the restriction was lifted, the
prohibition was in effect whenever the Dow moved by more than 50
points.
The restriction increases transaction-induced volatility by mak-
8 New York Stock Exchange Rule 80A; Exchange Act Release No. 25,559, 40 SEC
Dock. 966 (1988).
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ing arbitrage more difficult. This isolates the stock market from the
futures market so that each market must separately satisfy demands
for liquidity in what is essentially the same risk. Volatility increases
because order flow imbalances in the two markets sometimes cancel.
A restriction on arbitrage, however, makes it more difficult to cross
a buy order placed in one market with a sell order placed in the
other market.
C. Increased Margins
Throughout financial history, many have believed that specula-
tion increases volatility. Accordingly, it has been proposed that
greater margins be placed on stocks and futures to control this po-
tential source of instability.
Although speculation frequently is associated with periods of
high volatility, virtually no empirical evidence supports the view that
speculation causes high volatility. Instead, it is more likely that
speculation is drawn toward high volatility, especially transaction-
induced volatility. The concepts developed in Section 2 illustrate
this. Informed speculators take positions in opposition to order
flow imbalances. The greater the order flow imbalances are, the
greater the transaction-induced volatility is, and the greater the
profits to be made by well informed traders who speculate against
them. The result is an association of speculation with volatility, not
as a cause, but rather as a consequence that reduces transaction-
induced volatility. This suggests that higher margins will not de-
crease volatility.
Not all speculators, however, are well informed. If the specula-
tors are noise traders, higher margins could lower transaction-in-
duced volatility. The result depends on whether the noise traders
attract sufficient interest from well informed traders to offset, or
even more than offset, the volatility that the noise traders produce,
and, whether higher margins would have a greater discouraging ef-
fect on noise traders than on informed traders. If not, higher mar-
gins would cause higher volatility.
Even if high margins are merited, they will be difficult to en-
force in practice. In the face of high regulatory margin require-
ments, some security-holders will substitute from broker supplied
leverage to leverage obtained by borrowing against their home and
other assets. The result will be the same exposure to risk, but prob-
ably at a slightly higher cost. The margin requirement can also be
subverted by firms that borrow money and use the proceeds to buy
their own stock. Ignoring taxes, the result of this transaction is ex-
actly the same as holding the original stock in a margin account. If
margins are increased, holders who want more leverage will buy
[Vol. 74:927938
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more highly leveraged firms, or demand that management increase
leverage.
D. Transaction Taxes
Transaction taxes make active trading strategies less profitable.
Since market-makers tend to be active traders, they will withdraw
their services. This will increase transaction-induced volatility. To
the extent that noise traders are also active traders, they will also
withdraw. While that may decrease volatility, it may also increase it
since their withdrawal reduces the incentives to being an informed
market-maker.
To a trader, a trading commission is functionally equivalent to a
transaction tax. Both make trade expensive. When fixed commis-
sions were eliminated in May, 1975,9 commissions dropped substan-
tially, and volume greatly increased. However, market volatility,
measured in percent, generally decreased. The additional trade
probably stabilized rather than destabilized prices. It would thus
appear that a transaction tax will increase volatility.
IV
THE ECONOMICS OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION LIMITS
Many concerns have been raised recently about mergers and
acquisitions in our economy. Although a complete discussion of the
economics of this subject requires more space than is available here,
it is important to address the issue because mergers and acquisitions
have been blamed for recent increases in market volatility.
Wrongly associating mergers and acquisitions with market vola-
tility falsely justifies new regulations to restrict them. The danger
lies in the economic costs of restricting mergers and acquisitions.
These can be enormous relative to any value that may (and perhaps
may not) accrue to decreasing volatility through restrictions on
mergers and acquisitions.
The most important argument relating merger and acquisition
activity to increased market volatility has less to do with mergers and
acquisitions than with the debt that often is used to finance them.
Merged firms are frequently recapitalized so that the resulting firm
is more highly leveraged than either of the original firms. This
makes the new equity more volatile.
An example illustrates how stock volatilities depend on lever-
age. Suppose that a firm is financed only by equity. Stock in this
firm entitles its owners to receive the full benefit of the firm's earn-
ings. The value of the stock therefore depends on the expected
9 SEC Rule 19b-3 (effective May 1, 1975).
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value of these uncertain earnings. Fundamental stock volatility is a
function of how uncertain these earnings are.
Now suppose that the firm recapitalized by issuing debt equal to
half the value of the stock and uses the lroceeds to buy half of the
original stock. The firm is now financed half by stock and half by
debt. Stockholders are now entitled to receive the full benefit of the
firm's earnings, but only after interest has been paid to the
debtholders. Since interest payments must be made whether earn-
ings are high or low, the debtholders do not bear much of the risk of
the firm. They are at risk only to the extent that the new firm may
be unable to pay interest and principal when done. The new equity,
which is approximately equal in value of half of the old equity, must
now bear virtually all of the risk that formerly was borne by all of the
old equity.
The increased use of debt financing in our economy probably
has less to do with mergers and acquisitions than with the corporate
income tax. Corporations pay taxes on earnings after interest pay-
ments. A corporation may decrease its tax bill by increasing its lev-
erage. The tax savings that result increase the value of the firm.
Although this strategy has long been known, it is used more now
because the junk bond market has become more respectable and
because the costs to bondholders of bankruptcy have declined. Sev-
eral recent studies show that junk bonds are not as risky as per-
ceived and that their high interest rates more than offset losses in
the event of bankruptcy.
Unfriendly acquisitions often increase leverage because former
managers of the firm either failed to recognize the increase in value
that would result from obtaining additional leverage, or were un-
willing to make the adjustment. There are, of course, other very
important reasons for mergers and acquisitions.
To understand the costs of limiting merger and acquisition ac-
tivity, it is necessary to understand their economic purpose. Merg-
ers, and especially hostile acquisitions, are the means by which poor
management is removed and replaced by better management.
The removal of poor management should be the responsibility
of a firm's shareholders. Shareholders, however, are generally un-
willing to exercise that responsibility. Determining whether a firm is
well managed is often quite costly. Since this information benefits
all shareholders, each one hopes that someone else will bear the
cost. The result is that few shareholders do. Shareholders try to
solve this problem by electing directors to represent them. The di-
rectors, however, generally do not have the resources to fairly and
accurately determine whether management is doing a good job.
They are also often co-opted by management so that they do not
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independently represent shareholder interests. It therefore can be
very difficult to change management from within.
The need for internal oversight of managers is reduced if they
face the threat of losing their jobs through a successful outside
tender offer. The market for corporate control is therefore less a
market for ownership in firms as it is a market for senior managerial
talent. The threat of a tender offer encourages management to
work harder. Incompetent management is removed by successful
tender offers.
One criticism directed at mergers and acquisitions is that the
money used for acquisitions is money that could and should be used
for new investment. The problem with this statement can be seen
clearly in light of the fact that virtually all of the money used to buy
firms is paid to its former owners. The money does not simply dis-
appear. Rather, in the hands of the former owners, it remains avail-
able for reinvestment.
The problems associated with limiting mergers and acquisitions
deserve much more space than is available here. In general, efforts
to limit them can have profound negative effects on economic effi-
ciency. Unfortunately, the resulting loss of national wealth probably
would not be associated with the entrenchment of management. In-
stead, it most likely would be blamed on increased competition from
abroad.
SUMMARY
Although the October 1987 stock crash was the largest market
crash ever experienced in the United States, there have been few
real financial disruptions associated with it. It now appears that lit-
tle danger remains of a major decline in economic activity due to the
crash.
The danger of regulatory overreaction, however, still exists.
Proposals for trading halts, price limits, restricted access to comput-
erized order submission systems, greater margins, transaction taxes,
and various limits on mergers and acquisitions currently are being
debated. Some have been implemented.
Most of these proposals are unlikely to significantly reduce
transaction-induced volatility. They will, however, impose signifi-
cant costs on the financial markets and on the economy. The results
of their application can be a loss of trading to overseas markets,
more expensive capital costs to our corporations, and significantly
less efficient production in our economy. Evidence indicates that
the conditions that led to the crash no longer threaten the economy.
Volatility has been decreasing steadily since the crash and has now
returned to normal levels. The market for portfolio insurance has
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declined by one-third its former level. These self-corrections sug-
gest that further regulatory intervention is unnecessary.
